Functions to Represent Utility Functions
We are considering an individual whose evaluation and consequent choice of actions is accomplished through the use of the expected utility hypothesis [7] , For our purposes it is assximed, that the individual has uncertainty only with respect to a dollar amount w.
Letting v(w) be the individual's utility on the dollar amount w, we will make the common assumption that this utility function is increasing on w with upper and lower bounds. It is then cleeur that there exists a linear transformation on any utility function of this form which will give us the utility function in tb6 form of a distribution function. Since linear transformations do not affect either the individual's ciioices or his certainty equivalent then any utility function satisfying the above restrictions could be converted to a distribution function without altering the individual's, preferences for various decisions.
As it turns out there are advantages to having the utility function represented by a distribution function. In The results are also useful for purposes of estimation. If we assume that an individual's utility function is from a specific family of distribution functions and in addition we have data on certainty equivalents for various gambles along with the probability distributions on the payoffs then we can estimate the parameters of that individual's utility function. This procedure was used by Berhold [2] to estimate the utility function for a large government contractor under the assumption that it was an exponential utility function.
As we said, the individual is , in effect, choosing the paraneters of the probability distrioution on w.
For a specific class or type of probability distributions (Gaussian, binomial, etc.) we can characterize the probability distribution by certain parameters (a and p for the Gaussian distribution). V/e are letting a vector, denoted by a, index these distributions, thus a = [a., a^..., a ]. For example, with the Gaussian distribution, we could let a^= y and a" = a, where n = 2.
In general i%'e will let w = x (a;z) where the probability distribution on z is not a function of the decision. For example, z can have a standard Gaussian distribution (zero mean and unit variance) and let
x(a;z) = za + \i. ' Next we will augment the individual's payoff by a money amount h(a) (positive or negative). So his net payoff will be 1)
x(a;z) + h(a)
where h(a°) = and a°is an arbitrary vector. Later v;e will make a** more specific. We define h(a) as a dollar amount such that 2) Ev rx(a;z) + h(a)J = Ev T x(a°;z) + h(a°)l .
So in taking the partial derivative of (2) we get 3) E<v' r / \^!./^'^r 3x(a;z) xCy, a;z) = p + zo.
We will let a°be a^= u°and a^= a°.
When x(a;z) has a normal distribution it is immediately clear that 8) h(p,a) = g(0;y) -p + y| where p is used to index the function g(a). So, using (6) we next get d g(o;p) = -E[zTr(z|a) da].
-6-Next we will determine Ti(2|a). The constants will be ignored until the end because we knov; 7T(z|a) is a density function and it will turn out to be a well-known type. Since the denominator of (6) which holds for all cases where x(a,z) has a normal distribution.
The result^in (lU) confirms our intuition in the following manner:
We would intuitively expect R(a,y) to be strictly increasing (decreasing) in a if y > (<) y .
Vie would also expect R(o,y) to be strictly decreasing so from (4) 26) d g{a;y) = 2nada.
-10-
We note that tliis is independent of y'. On integration and evaluation between and 0;v we get 27) h(o-;:) = na?.
Dropping « then fron (18) we observe that R(M,a) = no . Equation (27) is confirmed by Fruend's results [5, p. 255],
Berhold obtained an estimate of n = '+.25 x 10* for a governTTient contractor using the relationship in (27), [2, p. 101], And this vms used as a basis for determining the optimal sharing ratio in government incentive contracts [3] .
If the probability distribution on x(a;z) has only one parameter then our problem is somev/hat simplified, ' As before v;e v/ill drop the " henceforth.
In the same manner as before we get where a°is the value of the parameter such that variance of y is zero.
For the exponential distribution this would be where X = 0. Thus we get R(a) = h(a).
We observe R(0) = and R'(X) > for all X > 0. This result confirms our intuition. Intuitively we v;ould also assume 34) dR(X)V erbally the decision maker has a lower risk premium as <p increases. Even if the concept does not accurately reflect reality (in the sense that people do not actually have Gaussian utility functions) it should still be useful as a first approximation because of the computational simplicity.
